Political Language and Trust: A Study in Machiavelli and Hobbes by Wenzel, Lauren
Oberlin 
Digital Commons at Oberlin 
Honors Papers Student Work 
1984 
Political Language and Trust: A Study in Machiavelli and Hobbes 
Lauren Wenzel 
Oberlin College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Repository Citation 
Wenzel, Lauren, "Political Language and Trust: A Study in Machiavelli and Hobbes" (1984). Honors Papers. 
635. 
https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors/635 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Work at Digital Commons at Oberlin. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Honors Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Oberlin. For 
more information, please contact megan.mitchell@oberlin.edu. 
Political Language and Trust: 




May 3, 1984 
Table of Contents 
I. Introduction ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• l 
II . Language: An Overview •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 6 
III. Language as Power: The Ruler's View •••••••••••• 15 
IV. The Place of Persuasion •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 33 
v. The People's Perspective •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 52 
VI. The Search for Standards ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 61 
Whoever gets around you must be sharp 
and guileful as a snake: even a god 
might bow.to you in ways of dissimilation. 
You! You chameleon! 
Bottomless bag of tricks! Here in your own country 
would you not give your stratagems a rest 
or stop spellbinding for an instant? 
-Athena to Odysseus in The Odyssey 
"'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in rather a 
scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean­
neither more nor less.' 
"'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make 
words mean different things.' 
"'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'who is to be 
master - that's all.'" 
-Alice in Wonderland 
"The use of force alone is but temporary. 
It may subdue for a moment; but it does 
not remove the necessity of subduing again; 
and a nation is not to be governed which is 
perpetually to be conquered." 
-Edmund Burke 
It is not possible to discuss politics without assuming a degree, 
however minimal, of trust. To deny the existence of any trust at all 
is to assume, as Hobbes does, a war, whether hot or cold, of all 
against all. While it is possible for people to live in such a 
condition, they cannot live together in any sense that can be called 
political. Even in societies which are divided into hostile groups, 
people either align themselves with a group, expressing their loyalty 
to its goals. Alternatively, they may withdraw from the political 
sphere, rejecting it completely, or wait until a stable government 
emerges which they may trust. If government is based entirely on 
force,it is, as Burke points out, not governing, but subduing. For 
others, who focus not on force as it may supplant trust, but on a 
commonly shared vision of politics, trust may almost seem to be a 
negative starting point because it is something that many political 
thinkers accept as a given. To speak of trust is to call into 
question all of the other possibilities that politics might offer, as 
it is the precondition for them. 
Yet for thinkers like Hobbes and Machiavelli, political life is one 
in which serious inconveniences must be weighed against each other. It 
is not a simple matter for people to live together, or to be governed. 
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Choices often must be made which are the lesser of two evils. For these 
reasons, which stem from the psychological asssumptions made about human 
beings, Machiavelli and Hobbes are often seen as cynical or pessimistic 
theorists. Yet both thinkers want to convince people that the kind of 
political life he describes is a worthwhile enterprise. Consequently, 
individuals are invited to consult their self interest in order to 
decide how they could be served by Hobbes' or by Machiavelli's scheme. 
Still, neither theorist confines himself to a discussion of individual 
interests, for both realize that these can only be attained when there 
is a stable political situation. Hobbes calls this condition peace. 
Machiavelli refers to the citizens' need for security. Both of these 
terms are a.way of expressing the need for a public trust that is 
necessary for stability. 
Order may be kept through force. But trust is an expression of 
the relationship between a ruler and a people, or between the people. 
And because any relationship must be developed through communication, 
one that involves a whole society necessarily relies on language. 
Through language, parties represent themselves, promise, persuade, 
educate and even threaten. Through language people make themselves 
known to each other. This is not to say that language is the only way 
in which this can be done. "Actions speak louder than words" is a 
truism precisely because language is so often used to obscure reality 
from others, or from oneself. But actions inevitably are supplemented 
by language in politics, for without it, they are inadequate content for 
politics. The most radical gesture or daring act may have no public 
impact if it is not recognized by the people, discussed and 
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communicated . 
Both Machiavelli and Hobbes accept Aristotle's dictum that speech 
is necessary for politics. But what they point out is what Aristotle, 
who accepted people's political nature as a given, does not - that 
speech is necessary for politics because trust is developed through 
language, and trust is the groundwork for politics. Speech may also be 
necessary for deliberation, for determining what justice is, and for 
making laws, but all of these can only follow once the groundwork is 
laid . 
While language is obviously not the sole content of politics for 
Machiavelli or Hobbes, it is considered by both to be equally as 
important as force.· The question that now arises is how language is to 
be used to accomplish what force cannot, and whether the realm of 
language in politics can remain separate from the realm of force, or if 
language too becomes a form of coercion. Trust is a political 
condition that depends on the use of language. While personal 
relationships may rest upon a trust that is unspoken, a public trust 
which forms the basis for all political actions must rely on language. 
Yet obviously, not all language is conducive to trust. Lies, threats, 
and broken promises are all uses of language which work to destroy 
trust. I want to explore the ways in which Machiavelli and Hobbes use 
language in politics. How far is their use of language compatible 
with the amount of trust that they see as necessary to maintain 
political order? And if it is compatible, are there any other 
standards by which we might still judge it to be an illegitimate use 
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of language? 
What exactly is meant by the notion of an illegitimate use of 
language? Does it mean going beyond the boundaries that these thinkers 
see as legitimate for language? Or can we look at the use of language 
by applying standards that these thinkers do not? Hanna Pitkin points 
out that deciding between these two approaches is somewhat analogous 
to the controversy created by Max Weber's redefinition of the term 
"legitimacy". Opposing the usual definition of "legitimacy", 
(conforming to certain standards or principles), Weber defined the 
term to mean "what is considered to be legitimate, 111 presumably by the 
subjects within any state. In politics, therefore, subjects or 
citizens would determine legitimacy by their behavior (obedience). 
The questions involved in exploring the uses of language are similar. 
Is language used wrongly only when it is felt to be so? Or is it 
possible to discuss criteria for language apart from people's 
perceptions of the way language is being used? In order to address 
these questions in Machiavelli and Hobbes, we must first examine both 
thinkers' conceptions of language and the ways in which it is to be 
used. Language as a way of exercising power must be a particular 
focus, for it is in this area that the issue of possible misuse 
becomes clearest. 
Persuasion is a political skill which is clearly, temptingly 
powerful, but it is a form of power that may seem innocuous. It can 
have the paradoxical quality of seeming not to exist at all when it is 
being most effectively used. Finally, it is the tool that is most 
effective for bringing political ideas to a personal level. It 
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addresses itself to the personality and individuality of the subject or 
citizen far more than any kind of force could do, for persuasion must 
win over the mind, while force merely subdues the- body. Persuasion, 
both Machiavelli and Hobbes recognize, is power, and power of a very 
effective sort since it is exersised not negatively, by repression, but 
positively, by tapping into a reservoir of passions and intellect, and 
channelling them in a certain direction. 
Exersising power in politics through language can be done in may 
other ways as well - the making of contracts, deception, and education 
are only a few. But before we can look at these possibilities, we must 
first look at Hobbes' and Machiavelli's views on language in general. 
For language, as well as being the stuff persuasion is made of, is also 
for both the source of political knowledge. Language thus can be seen 
as the basis of politics. Yet it can also be seen as a microcosm of 
politics, for the terms in which language and politics are described are 
for both Machiavelli and Hobbes strikingly similar. Perhaps in looking 
from these two view points, we can understand how their views on 
language shape their attitudes toward politics, and how politics may set 
the ends for the use of language. 
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II. Language: An Overview 
This double perspective is part of the nature of language. 
Consciously we make decisions about what to say, and how it is to be 
said. Yet we also think in language. It is something we have already 
learned by the time we begin to think about politics, and which 
necessarily influences the way we think. Knowledge is first formulated 
through language, then must be expressed in words in order to be shared. 
Thus language is the link between public and private, between the 
internal workings of the individual mind, and the voices of other 
individuals that make up the community. How this relationship is 
described by Machiavelli, and by Hobbes, largely dermines how language 
is to be used in politics. 
For Machiavelli, reliable political knowledge is obtained through 
personal experience and through the study of history. Machiavelli 
suggests these sources as the best tutors for the new prince, as well as 
stressing in the introduction to The Discourses and the preface to The 
Prince that they are the sources of his own insights: 
••• I have been unable to find anything which I hold 
so dear or esteem so highly as that knowledge of the 
deeds of great men which I have acquired through a long 
experience of modern events and a constant study of 
the past. 1 
Every important point that is asserted is illustrated with the proper 
historical example - either modern, or, far more often, from 
Machiavelli's historical ideal, the Roman republic. While experience 
seasons a ruler, and gives him sharper judgement, history is reliable 
because the passions of men remain the same, and events, while not 
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likely to repeat themselves exactly, recur in similar ways to events of 
the past • 
• • • all cities and all peoples are and ever have been 
animated by the same desires and the same passsions� 
so that it is easy, by diligent study of the past, to 
forsee what is likely to happen in the future in any 
republic, and to apply those remedies that were used 
by the ancients, or, not finding any that were employed 
by them, to devise new ones from the similarity of the 
events. 2 
History, then is a kind of collective experience. The diligent student 
of history may gain from all the personal experiences of the great 
leaders of the past by studying their actions and the results of those 
actions, learning what kinds of measures to adapt in different 
circumstances. 
Language is a basis of politics because learning from experience 
for Machiavelli means being able to draw out maxims for action from 
incidents. This is true both of history and of personal experience. 
But language, more importantly, contains history. Without language we 
would have no record of the past and no experience, other than personal, 
to draw upon. This is discussed in a chapter of The Discourses 
entitled, nThe Changes of Religion and of Languages, Together with the 
Occurrences of Deluges and Pestilence, Destroy the Record of Things." 
Discussing them in turn, Machiavelli points out how each might destroy 
an entire culture. Yet a new language he recognizes as different from 
the other dangers to a culture. 
U:he Christians, proceding against the heathen religioaj 
destroyed all its institutions and its ceremonies, and 
effaced all record of the ancient theology. It is true 
that they did not succeed in destroying entirely the 
record of the glorious deeds of the illustrious men of 
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the ancient creed, for they were forced to keep up the 
Latin language by the necessity of writing their new laws 
in that tongue; but if they could have written them in a 
new language • • •  there would have been no record 
whatever left of preceding events. 3 
This would have been a tragedy for Machiavelli, for it is to those 
"glorious deeds" that he constantly refers, and he recognizes that the 
whole past to which he appeals as a political ideal could have been 
eradicated by the loss of the language. Indeed, this was the fate of 
Tuscany, who, as Machiavelli points out, "was once powerful, religious, 
and virtuous; it had its own customs and language; but all this was 
destroyed by the Roman power, so that there remained nothing of it but 
the memory of its name. n4 
Language contains history, and in doing so contains knowledge and 
political ideals. Through language we can appeal to possibilities not 
perceived in the present by pointing to the past. Yet political 
knowledge and possibilities are not contained within language like fish 
in a sea, but are dissolved within its very structure for Machiavelli. 
In "Dialogue on Language", Machiavelli, in examining the nature of 
Dante's writings, makes many observations on language in general which 
are strikingly similar to his description of politics. 
First, Machiavelli discusses particular languages - Florentine, 
Bolognese, Latin, and the "court language", rather than speaking of 
language as a generic, abstract concept. Just as he does not discuss 
"the nature of politics" but Florentine, or Italian politics, 
Machiavelli speaks of particular tongues, analysing not what language 
is, but what it does, what it says, and how it says them. Language is 
a common bond between a particular people, and it is used to express 
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their culture and their values. Machiavelli is keenly aware of how 
language expresses nationality, just as Italian politics was often the 
expression of the ambitions of each particular city state. 
And as the assertions·of the city states led to conflicts in the 
political realm, Machiavelli sees language, not as passive or static, 
but as continually shifting, words from one language passing into 
another. Language too is a struggle. He discusses the ways in which 
languages may become bastardized by foreign phrases, and eventually may 
lose their own identity. To avoid this, new words must be conquered: 
Now a country's language is one which presses words 
borrowed from elsewhere into its own service and is 
powerful enough to subdue, and not be subdued by, the 
words it borrows, grappling the foreign matter so 
tight that it seems a part of itself. 5 
Just as politics is largely comprised of power struggles, so is 
language. 
This passage occurs in the context of an "argument" with Dante. 
Machiavelli has summoned him up to answer charges for rejecting the 
Florentine tongue as his idiom. Dante insists that he writes in "the 
language of the court.• Machiavelli
)
however, examines Dante's language 
and triumphantly concludes that he is really writing in Florentine, but 
refuses to acknowledge it because of his grudge against his native city. 
This brings out another important aspect of language, especially as it 
relates to literature. Machiavelli wants to claim Dante for Florence 
because he raised the Florentine language to new heights of beauty and 
eloquence. A great writer like Dante can give new life to a language, 
just as a great leader can stir his people to return to their pure, 
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? 
uncorrupted states, and to become virtuous citizens. Both are worthy of 
imitation, but neither can be completely mimicked, for true greatness 
requires both natural virtue, and experience gained from studying great 
minds. "It is impossible for art to surpass nature" in creativity, and 
yet 
There are many who all write well and have the qualities 
needed for a writer. And this could not have happened 
before you, with Petrarch and Boccaccio, had written. 
For aiming to reach this height, but being hindered by 
their local dialect, they needed someone who by his 
example could teach them how to forget the original 
barbarism in which their native tongues steeped them. 6 
Great writers may inspire, instruct and rejuvenate a language as a great 
leader may do with his people. In fact, Machiavelli invites this 
parallel by comparing words to Roman soldiers. Though Rome recruited 
the vast majority of its army from the provinces, they became truly 
Roman soldiers through strict discipline and instruction. So new and 
foreign words can strengthen and enrich a language when they are brought 
into it by a writer who uses them with talent and care. 
Finally, the feel of politics pervades Machiavelli's insistence on 
seeing words within the proper context. Certain actions cannot be 
advocated apart from the situation in which they must be performed. 
Words cannot adequately convey meaning and nuance if they are stripped 
from their context • 
• • • there are many things which cannot be written well 
without understanding the local, idiomatic usages of 
whatever tongue is most highly thought of. If native 
terms are needed you must go to the place where the 
language had its origin, or you will produce a piece of 7 writing in which one part does not correspond to the rest. 
This sensitivity to the local, the particular, is also stressed in 
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every action a prince or a republic must perform. Part of the reason 
why Machiavelli is so often judged to be an immoral writer sterns from 
his unwillingness to endorse a moral code apart from the situation. 
Actions must always be adopted to circumstances if they are to be 
effective - so must words. Language and politics are intertwined in 
subtle ways. They are historical, they are sources of nationality, and 
they hold up great leaders and their works for us to emulate and admire. 
Hobbes, on the other hand, is much more straightforward in his 
reliance on language. It might at first seem strange that one who 
viewed people as essentially atomistic and isolated should put so much 
emphasis on language. Yet while it is obvious that Hobbes makes 
language the cornerstone of his theory, his views upon it are not 
completely clear. In Chapter 4, "On Speech", Hobbes defines language as 
a nominalist would. It is not an organic entity shared by a community, 
but a mechanical device, invented piecemeal, consisting primarily of 
nouns, and then of other less important words -"connexions", including 
verbs, adjectives, etc. Words seem to be almost as aloof from each 
other as people are. Language in the natural condition seems to both 
cause and reflect people's alienation from each other. They all fear 
violent death, as each person may use bodily force against any one else, 
yet language too is used as a weapon of all against all to defend 
individual interests. 
A man must take heed of words; which beside the 
signification of what we imagine of their nature, have 
a signification also of the nature, disposition, and 
interest of the speaker 1 • • • for one man calleth 
wisdom, what another cllleth fear; and one cruelty, 
what another justice. 
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The contract (which will be discussed at length below) involves creating 
an artificial environment where trust may exist. This is partly 
created by authorizing one person to wield the power of the sword over 
all others, but more importantly, by creating an artificial language 
so that all people may speak of public matters in the same terms. 
Understanding, for Hobbes, is a technical term, implying precise 
knowledge of exactly what concept was intended by the speaker. 
When any man, upon the hearing on any speech, hath those 
thoughts which the words of that speech were ordained 
and consituted to signify, then he is said to understand it.9 
Each word stands directly for one concept, and therefore any confusion 
or ambiguity is avoided. Artificial language creates the conditions 
for people to understand each other. 
Language then is important as the basis of politics, but is also an 
essential part of its content. Politics rests directly on language. 
Though consciously departing from most Aristotelian assumptions about 
politics, Hobbes retains the distinctive emphasis on speech as the 
cornerstone of his theory. 
The reason man is a being meant for political association 
• • •  is evident. Nature, according to our theory, makes 
nothing in vain1 and man alon
1 
of the animals is furnished 
with the faculty of language. O 
Their difference concerns the type of language that politics rests 
upon. While Aristotle assumes that natural language is adequate, 
Hobbes argue that the true rules of politics can only be discovered by 
the scientific method, and this method begins with clear definitions. 
As Hobbes himself puts it: 
• • • the light of human minds is perspicuous words, 
by exact definitions first snuffed and purged from 
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ambiguity, reason is the pace, increase of scirrce, 
the way; and the benefit of mankind, the end. 
Science consists in examining the components of a thing so that it may 
be completely understood as a whole. Thus concepts must be broken down 
into words, and the words precisely defined so that there is no room for 
doubt. "Truth consists in right ordering of names." 12 
Here language is conceived of as a device, "without which there 
had been among men; neither commonwealth, nor society, nor contract, nor 
peace." 13 For Hobbes, the primary function of language is to stand 
for something, so that thoughts may be expressed in words. Of four 
basic uses of speech, the most important is science, "to register what 
by cogitation, we find to be the cause of any thing." 14 Only secondly 
is speech to be used for communication- for sharing knowledge, and 
even knowledge can only truly be communicated when terms have been 
ordained by the Sovereign. 
Yet Hobbes' attitude toward language is not that of a complete 
nominalist. Later in Leviathan he departs from the framework which he 
has set up in Chapter 4, especially in his use of the term "justice". 
When speaking of the law of nature, Hobbes says, 
All judges, sovereign and subordinate, if they 
refuse to hear proof, refuse to do justice: for 
though the sentence be just, yet the judges that 
condemn without hearing the proofs offered, are 
unjust judges. 15 
/ Here "justice" is working on two levels at once. The sentence must be 
just, because Hobbes defines the word justice to mean obeying the civil 
laws. The Sovereign cannot perform an unjust action by virtue of how 
the word works, for the Sovereign is not bound by civil law, and 
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therefore cannot break it. Yet Hobbes wants to argue that a Sovereign 
who disregards the law of nature is unjust, even if his actions cannot 
be said to be so. These two levels of justice reveal a tension in the 
way Hobbes thinks about language, or at least about certain concepts. 
Is this tension a recognition that pure artifice cannot adequately 
encompass the complexities of political morality? This is a theme that 
must be examined as we look more closely at other aspects of Hobbes' 
work. 
Language for Hobbes embodies all the potentialities of people - the 
danger of their passions, as well as the beauty and precision of the 
knowledge it is possible for them to attain. Control of language does 
mean very real control over people. This is clearly true for 
Machiavelli as well. What is less clear is now far this control was 
intended to go. Does it mean changing people, making them into the best 
possible subjects or citizens they can be? Or is language simply 
intended to provide a structure within the state, to provide a common 
ground for those within it and thereby insure a measure of stability? 
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III. Language as Power: The Ruler's View -- ---
Machiavelli and Hobbes are writing for the leaders in the state, 
giving advice as to how best solve the problems that they describe. 
Language can be used to provide a key part of the solution. Both 
thinkers envision a language that can create a bond between people, and 
between the people and their rulers. This bond is important; it must 
secure the power of the leaders, and the stability of the state, even 
when the strains of differing interests weigh against it. How well 
would the language of Machiavelli ·or Hobbes establish this bond? 
The problems that each describes are familiar. Human nature 
remains the same throughout history. As long as people have passions, 
there will be war, ambition, envy, greed, and distrust. Hobbes and 
Machiavelli describe human nature in very similar ways. Machiavelli 
explains: 
nature has created men so that they desire everything, 
but are unable to attain it; the faculty of acquiring 
discontent with what they have, and dissatisfaction 
with themselves result from it. This causes the changes 
in their fortunes; for some men desire to have more, 
whilst others fear to lose what they have, emnities and 
war are the consequences. 1 
People are motivated by ambition and fear. Hobbes too sees people as 
driven by a "perpetual and restless desire of power after power"2 and by 
a fear of death. Because people are driven by these passions they are 
continually at war, even when not actually fighting, distrusting each 
other so much that it is impossible for them to live peaceably together. 
With this view of human nature, it is not surprising that both thinkers 
reject the notion that people in this condition can solve their own 





person to rule through a judicious balance of force and and reliance on 
language. 
For Machiavelli, solutions change as cirumstances do. "Men in 
their conduct, and especially in their most prominent actions, should 
well consider and conform to the times in which they live." 3 This 
conviction perhaps explains why Machiavelli himself, several times in 
The Prince and The Discourses gives contradictory advice. An example 
is his counsel that "a prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when by 
so doing it would be against his interest." 4 Three chapters later he 
can urge the prince to make and keep alliances with a powerful ruler 
because "he is under an obligation to you and friendship has been 
established, and men are never so dishonest as to oppress you with 
such a patent ingratitude." 5 This contradiction stems from the two 
perspectives Machiavelli is adopting. When the prince has power, and 
it cannot harm him to break promises, he should do so. But when the 
prince needs a strong ally, he ought not to let the fear of broken 
promises prevent him from seeking assistance. Machiavelli rarely 
issues specific absolute dictu'!is. Advice is qualified from every 
side, for he is more interested in teaching rulers to learn from 
history and to be flexible, perceptive and decisive in their actions, 
than in encouraging them to rule in any more specific way. 
Machiavelli does outline the types of solutions that are best 
employed in two extreme situations: what he considers to be the worst 
and the best forms of government. The prince, and the leaders in a 
republic represent at one extreme the bottom line on what a leader may 
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do to maintain political stability, and at the other the full range of 
possibilities for political society. 
The prince relies heavily upon reputation. While he may be 
required to install certain unpopular or cruel measure, he must always 
seem to be the Christian paragon of virtue. "To see and hear him, he 
should seem to be all mercy, faith, integrity, humanity and religion." 6 
The prince must keeps his reputation intact, relying upon illusions, 
lies, and other subtle deceptions so that he may keep the love of the 
people, while performing the actions that are necessary to preserve the 
state. But whatever the prince may do, he must not make himself hated 
by the people. About this, Machiavelli is adamant. Even his famous 
advice that a prince is better off feared than loved concludes with the 
warning that he can never afford to be hated. This emphasis on not 
being hated reveals the importance of a minimal level of trust that must 
be maintained. 
This level of trust is not difficult to maintain in a principality. 
Hatred is only incurred "by being rapacious, and usurping the property 
and women of his subjects." 7 So long as these are left untouched, the 
people, self-interested and materialistic, will be content to live their 
lives, oblivious to public affairs. At the other extreme, if he is 
considered despicably weak, his more ambitious subjects may conspire 
against him. Language enables the prince to shield his unpopular 
actions from the people, and to represent himself as a strong, virtuous, 
and fearsome ruler. 
In a republic, there are stronger bonds between the people and 
their rulers. Ties exist not solely out of a desire for stability and 
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protection, but out of a common love for one's country, and a desire to 
serve it. And because ties are both more visible, and more important, 
language takes on a more prominent role. While reputation remains 
important, and while leaders may rely upon manipulative tactics to gain 
their ends, they are no longer simply acting in the eyes of the people, 
but acting with and for the people. In a republic, leaders rely upon 
the people as princes do not. They do not require passive, but active 
support. Citizens must be willing to give up their livesfor the state. 
Their active interest in affairs of state make the republic more vital, 
but it also requires that leaders be reponsive to the people. A 
republic, especially a republic that is often at war, demands a high 
level of solidarity that can only be achieved by two-way communication. 
In contrast, Hobbes sees only one solution to the chaos of 
people's natural condition. "The skill in making and maintaining 
commonwealths consisteth in certain rules, as doth arithmetic and 
geometry; not, as tennis play, on practice only." 8 Just as people's 
passions have put them in this predicament, they have tendencies which 
predispose them to peace; tendencies which they will act upon when 
they grow weary of war. This longing for peace leads people to make a 
contract with each other agreeing to "be contented with so much 
liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against 
himself." 9 Yet this contract would be useless without anyone to 
enforce it, so they further agree to choose one person, and to give 
him authority over them. They surrender to this Sovereign their 
wills, and their voices, so that his actions becomes theirs. Their 
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wills are united in him, and his voice is the voice of the 
commonwealth. Speech is no longer a weapon used to defend the 
interest of each, but a nuetral tool ordained by one person whose 
interest is the interest of all. 
These are the solutions that are offered: two opposite approaches, 
one emphasizing flexibility, often mixed with political sleight of hand, 
and the other advocating a method claiming to be as precise and 
unquestionably true as geometry. Hobbes and Machiavelli each claim a 
style of approach best suited to mediate the inherent contradictory 
passions in human nature. But they also offer minute advice on a number 
of particular areas. We must now turn to these, for Machiavelli's and 
Hobbes' attitudes toward areas like law, poetry, and ordinary language 
reveal how well their views on political language meet the specific 
needs of people in the state. 
If the aim of political speech is to create a bond between the 
people and their rulers, law is one effective means of reaching this 
end. By instituting guidelines for all, and punishments for 
transgressors, legal language creates the formal structure for 
communication between leaders and people. While many other types of 
speech also contribute to political language, law provides the 
framework for when and how they may be spoken . 
The best possible laws for Machiavelli are those which are given 
to a community by a wise legislator, and which keep the people honest 
and uncorrupted. Government began when people, nto prevent • • •  
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evils, set to work to make laws, and to institute punishments for 
those who contravened them. Such was the origin of justice.nlO But 
as governments inevitably degenerate, and people become corrupted, 
laws can no longer perform this function. They are no longer 
expressions of justice, but rules to be manipulated by those in power. 
Laws then lose their power to make people better citizens, and become 
simply boundaries upon their behavior. When the situation has reached 
this state, it becomes very difficult and dangerous to try to 
institute new laws. 
Machiavelli realizes the need for laws to change as people change 
In addition he is adamant that laws must be obeyed by all, even by those 
who make them, or they will cease to be respected. If a new prince 
finds old laws hindering his plans, he should not violate them, but 
destroy them and institute new ones in their place. At best, law 
teaches people to be good citizens, but even at its worst must be 
respected as a code of behavior. Machiavelli stresses that people 
cannot be expected to live in a state of perpetual uncertainty. They 
need to know that they are secure, and what acts they may safely commit, 
for men who are kept in doubt and uncertainty as to 
their lives will resort to every kind of measure to 
to secure themselves against danger, and will 
necessarily becorr more audacious and inclined to violent changes. 
Laws in this sense are a clear message from the prince to his people 
that they may consider their private lives safe provided they remain 
within the structure of behavior he has determined. 
7 l� is also Hobbes' definition of civil law. Laws are restricted 
solely to the regulation of behavior. They are nthe rules whereby every 
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man may know what goods he may enjoy, and what actions he may do.012 
There are also natural laws which are immutable and eternal, identical 
to moral law. In the natural condition, natural laws are not properly 
laws because there is no possible way of enforcing them. But when a 
commonwealth is settled, they becomes laws "because it is the Sovereign 
power that obliges men to obey them. 1113 Law for Hobbes, civil or 
natural, can only be compelling when there is a coercive force behind it 
to require obedience. 
Yet Hobbes also argues that the Sovereign, though not bound by 
civil law, is bound by natural law. This is an important part of his 
argument, for he wants to convice people that binding themselves to the 
Sovereign is not more inconvenient than the horrors of a civil war. He 
must find some way of asserting that the Sovereign is not completely 
free to behave as caprice might dictate toward his subjects. Yet how is 
the Sovereign bound by any coercive force to obey natural law? Hobbes 
argues: 
The off ice of the Sovereign • • •  consisteth in the 
end for which he was trusted with the Sovereign power, 
namely for the procuration of the safety of the 
people; to which he is obliged by the law of nature, 
and to render an account t�4
God, the author of that 
law, and to none but him. 
Apparently the fear of God is the "coercive" power that keeps the 
Sovereign in line with natural law. God and only God can punish the 
Sovereign for his transgressions. Hobbes argues that "there can be no 
contract where there is no tr.ust"15• Yet though he admits that for the 
Sovereign to break the laws of nature is a violation of his subjects 
trust; he maintains that the Sovereign's violation of the conditions of 
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the contract does not allow his subjects to break it. Subjects may not 
rebel against a Sovereign, even if he breaks natural laws, because it is 
not for them to judge him. Yet his actions have destroyed the trust 
that the contract was based upon. 
Though breach of trust cannot provide grounds for disobedience, 
fear for one's life can. Hobbes' logic requires him to concede that 
"the obligation to subjects to the Sovereign is understood to last as 
long, and no longer than the power lasteth by which he is able to 
protect them. 1116 Since self preservation is the end of government, 
when it can no longer be insured, subjects are released from their 
obligations. But how is the degree of protection to be evaluated? 
Hobbes admits that the subject himself is the best judge of his own 
danger. He is obligated "as much as in him lieth, to protect in war 
the authority, by which he is himself protected in time of peace."17 
Thus, men of "feminine courage" may run away form the battlefield when 
they fear for their lives, not unjustly, but dishonourably. 
But imagine a less urgent example: a commonwealth, at peace, being 
ruled poorly by a weak king. Hobbes would want to argue that even if a 
king were an incom�\:ent ruler, subjects would not be justified in 
defying or usurping him. First, these actions are not, like running 
away on the battlefield, the absence of assistance, but an actual attack 
on the Sovereign power. Second, though law requires power to enforce 
it, Hobbes would not want to admit that mere lack of power without 
urgent danger would nullify either civil or natural law. He is thus 
forced to employ the unreasonable logic that a person should not defy 
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laws even if he could get away with it, for if everyone acted thus, the 
commonwealth would be destroyed, which would ultimately be in no one's 
self interest. This is something like trying to convice a practiced 
shoplifter to refrain from theft because it raises prices for everyone. 
Hobbes originally appeals to self-interest in order to create the basis 
for the right of the Sovereign to govern, but there is an uneasy tension 
between the two that would reveal itself in individual choices when 
people have the power, but not the right to commit an illegal act. 
Law, then, for both thinkers, is an articulation of what is to 
be considered proper behavior. But the power of law lies outside 
itself. For Machiavelli, laws are only effective when they are 
administered by a competent ruler. The relationship between the 
prince and the people gives the law power. For Hobbes, law is the 
primary relationship between the pepole and their Sovereign. It is 
the Sovereign's word. Yet law derives its power from the consent of 
the people. Though law is stressed by both Machiavelli and Hobbes, it 
must be supplemented by other types of language. People must trust 
the prince, fearing his punishments, or believing in his good 
judgement, and they must have consented to the Sovereign, or believe 
they have consented. Both thinkers recognize that legal language, 
though important, cannot embrace all of the subtlety and diversity of 
politics. 
Poetry 
Machiavelli, a poet and playwright himself, recognizes literature 
as a needed outlet for expression, an amusement, and a critical tool 
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enabling people to look at everyday actions and events with a heightened 
awareness. He defines the purpose of comedy in the classic Aristotelian 
manner: 
The aim of comedy is to hold up a mirror to domestic 
life • • •  so that the men who came eagerly to 
enjoy themselves taste afterward the useful lesson 
that lay underneath.18 
For Machiavelli this meant working out many of his political themes in 
his poetry and plays. In the play Mandrangola , for example, a young 
man passionately desires to possess a virtuous lady, married to a 
foolish gullible husband. Assisted by a friend, a corrupt priest, and 
the lady's morally lax mother, the youth convinces her husband that his 
I� wife's infertility can only be cured by a e:-., of mandrake potion. Yet 
because the potion is poisonous to the next man who sleeps with her, a 
stranger must be found to "draw off" the poison, so that her husband may 
safely sleep with her. Naturally the stranger is the passionate young 
man. All conspire against the lady's moral objections for their own 
selfish or foolish reasons, and she submits. 
Not only does Machiavelli reveal how people can be manipulated when 
they are too dense or selfish to see things as they are, and how 
people's actions often belie their words, but the lady's final sigh that 
she is "not strong enough to refuse what Heaven wills me to accept"19 
is a recognition that he stresses again and again in his political 
works: actions must conform to the situations in which people find 
themselves. Mandrangola satirizes human foibles, yet it also points out 
that follies and passions often cannot be overcome, even by intelligence 
and goodness. 
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Hobbes, too, translated.and wrote poetry, yet he has no such high 
opinion of its ability to stimulate thought. Of the four uses of 
language, poetry is the last, used "to please and delight ourselves and 
others, by playing with words, innocently. 1120 Poetry requires a 
combination of fancy and judgement so that it may "please for the 
extravagancy, but •• • not displease by indiscretion. 1121 On the 
positive side, then, poetry is pleasant, harmless amusement. But Hobbes 
harshly criticizes poetic language when it is used in serious 
discussion, especially condemning metaphors. "For seeing they openly 
profess deceit, to admit them into counsel or reasoning, were manifest 
folly. 1122 Poetic language cannot be understood. Its words do not 
always refer to one precise concept, but attempt to awaken the passions, 
appealing to emotion rather than reason. Poetry is an amusement, and it 
is both foolish and dangerous to make more of it than this. 
Yet Hobbes himself is a very creative writer. Leviathan (the 
"artificial man" metaphor extended throughout the book) is filled with 
evocations of the terrors of civil war and the beauty of a peaceful 
commonwealth. The tone often turns from "scientific" explication to dry 
irony or scorn, and the final comparison in "The Kingdom of Darkness" of 
the papacy to the kingdom of the faeries is a brilliant satire. Hobbes 
obviously held these qualities of language to be valuable, and yet he 
wished to bar their influence on political discourse. Why? It is 
linked to his conviction that politics was no place for passion. 
"For the understanding is by the flame of the passions, never 
enlightened, but dazzled. 1123 Once it has led men into a commonwealth, 
it can give them no further useful political knowledge. Passion can 
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only discontent them with their lot, making them desire change in the 
hopes of illusory republics and liberties. 
Hobbes shares his distrust of poetry with Plato, who also attacks 
it for appealing to lower human capacities, and undercutting the 
potential for truly critical philosophical thinking. For Plato, 
poetry not only appeals to the passionate, sensual nature of people, 
but it purports to teach political knowledge. He needs to displace 
poetry in order to make room for philosophy as the true source of 
knowledge. The rhythm of poetry lulls people's minds toward 
unthinking acceptance of the satus quo. It leads them toward 
imitation, speaking without thinking, and above all, quoting poetry as 
a final authority on political problems. Like Plato, Hobbes advocates 
a new kind of critical thinking that is active, seeking, and not 
resting upon simple acceptance of popular wisdom. Yet as Plato 
criticized poetry to make room for philosophy as the source of wisdom, j 
Hobbes criticizes Greek philosophy in order to clear the ground for a 
new philosophy based on the scientific method He criticizes Plato's 
philosophy for being "rather a dream than a science, and set forth in 
senseless and insignificant language. 1124 For all his emphasis on 
questioning in philosophical dialogue, and his condemnation of the 
poetic mindset, Plato was still too much of a poet for Hobbes. 
For Plato does rely on myth, on evocation, and images. He speaks 
of "the Good", but never describes it in detail, believing that the 
highest possible knowledge cannot be adequately expressed in language. 
Plato did reject poetry as the authority for political knowledge, but 
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he relied on myth in a different way. Myth was not, as poetry often 
was, a threat to critical thinking, but represented a different kind 
of thinking in which truths could be intimated and understood as they 
could not be through logical discourse. The cave allegory could make 
the quest for knowledge and the position of the philosopher among men 
vivid and intelligible in a way that simple exposition could not. 
Hobbes' mixed attitude toward poetic language is different from 
Plato, though like him he does officially reject myth as method. 
Those arguments therefore that the whole universe is 
governed by one God1 that the ancients prefered the 
monarchical state before all others, ascribing the rule 
of the gods to one Jupiter 1 • • • al though, I say, these 
do hold forth monarchy as the more eminent to us, yet 
because they do it by examples and testimonies, and not 
by solid reason, we will pass them over. 25 
But, unlike Plato, Hobbes never concedes a place for myth in the realm 
of thought. He does not use fables to illustrate, but to frighten or 
threaten. While smoothly passing over Biblical authority above as not 
rational, he then condemns the killing of kings thought of as tyrants 
with the following: 
Who told thee that he was a tyrant? Hast thou 
eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that 
thou shouldst not eat? For why dost thou call 
him a tyrant, whom God hath made a king, except 
that thou, being a private person, usurp��st to 
thyself the knowledge of good and evil? 
Private opinion becomes equated with Original Sin. Hobbes sees in 
poetic language an appeal to passion, and never sees any more 
potential in it that that, even when he uses it himself. 
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Common Language 
Machiavelli's attitude toward the ordinary language people speak is 
evident from the exploration above. He understands its diachronic 
nature, how new words seep into a language, and how it may degenerate if 
it loses its own distictive character. While Machiavelli speaks of some 
tongues as "barbaric", he never thiks of ordinary language itself as 
such. He never speaks of a specific jargon for politics, or anything 
else for that matter. The one puzzling thing about his attitude toward 
common language is his own vocabulary. Machiavelli never defines the 
terms he uses. Their meanings must be gathered from the context. An 
example is his use of the word "virtu". This is not meant to refer to 
Christian virtues, but to the personal qualities of a person, such as 
strength and wisdom, that enable him to overcome the caprices of 
Fortuna, and accomplish what he sets out to do. That the root of the 
word is 0vir", suggests the "manly" qualities that enable one to 
overcome fortune, who is like a woman, and needs to be mastered.27 
This explains how Machiavelli can refer to Hannibal's "extreme 
cruelty and other virtues.028 
If we understand virtue in this sense, it becomes clear that 
Machiavelli was not changing the meaning of the word, but using it in an 
older, though still accepted, classical sense. Machiavelli's virtue is 
very like what the Greeks means by "arete". "The citizen of the polis 
aimed above all at the ideal which Phoenix had taught Achilles: to be a 
speaker of words and a doer of deeds.029 Virtue was personal 
excellence, and the rennaissance usage of the term encompassed both this 
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and the Christian meaning of the word. 
For Machiavelli does not change the meanings of words. His 
honesty, even when he advocates cruel measures, is perhaps his most 
striking characteristic, as well as an ironic one, in view of the 
deceptions he advocates. He does not seek to soften outrageous acts 
by glossing over them, using euphemisms, or seeking to morally justify 
them. He merely says, "a prince who wishes to maintain a state is 
often forced to do evil113 0, or even more plainly, "it is necessary for 
a prince • • •  to learn how not to be good. nJl Wh ile part icular 
terms, like virtue and fortune are complex, and have a specific 
personality within Machiavelli's writings, words in general are used 
as people use them. 
In constrast, Hobbes distrusts ordinary language. He calls it 
vulgar, considers it sloppy and imprecise, and therefore unfit for 
political use. "How fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things 
by the ordinary and inconstant use of words."32 Because "truth consists 
in right ordering of names", Leviathan begins with the definitions of 
important terms. Only when the correct names are assigned can the 
"connexions" be made. Hobbes creates a specific political vocabulary 
that must be learned by each subject. But new definitions of words 
means more than simply rejecting ordinary ambiguous language, for it 
also means imposing guidelines for what can be expressed. 
An exampl� s the tension in Hobbes' use of the word "justice" 
I, 
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noted in Chapter 2. When justice refers to civil laws, no act of the 
Sovereign can be unjust. But justice may also refer to obedience to 
divine laws. Hobbes does not want to wholly abandon the idea that 
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justice means something: something beyond what any given ruler might 
say it means. He wants justice to continue to refer to traditional 
notions of fairness and equity. But though this conception of justice 
is implied when Hobbes speaks of the duties of the Sovereign, it is 
not a definition to which a subject may appeal. For though a subject 
always retains the right to protect himself from bodily harm, he has 
no right, no matter what his situation, to justify his actions, or his 
principles, should the Sovereign oppose him. Consent entails giving 
up the right to use language as the subject might understand it, and 
accepting the definitions ordained by the Sovereign. While he may act 
with iniquity towards his subjects, they cannot complain of being 
treated unjustly. 
Hobbes cites the example of David, who had an innocent man, Uriah, 
put to death. Uriah had authorized his Sovereign's actions, and 
therefore was not injured by his own death. In fact, he willed his own 
death, for he had surrendered his will to David. But the first 
psychological assumption Hobbes makes is that people fear death, and 
that they can never surrender their right to live. A man, like 
Socrates, who refused the chance to escape death, Hobbes would 
,-, :� 
consider mad. Therefore, according to Hobb,f) definitions, the 
�", , 
condemned man is similtaneously willing and resisting his own death. 
This contradiction points to a problem in HobJ�� ideal political 
'·..,/' 
vocabulary. Terms are defined by the Sovereign, but although Hobbes 
refers to this language as scientific, there is no reason why the 
Sovereign's language should be rational. 
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Hobbes argues that when the Sovereign is a monarch, he is more 
likely to be rational. "Where the public and private interest are 
most closely united, there is the public most advanced. Now in 
monarchy, the private interest is the same as the public. 1133 Thus, 
for example, the Sovereign would not tax his subjects too heavily. 
This would make them weak, weakening the state, and not be in his 
interest. But Hobbes' argument here is like his reply to the fool -
self interest is defined so broadly that it encompasses the good of 
the entire state. While it would ultimately be in the Sovereign's 
self interest to rule rationally and justly, it would take a very 
wise, fair and level headed person to recognize this . 
But if the Sovereign shares the psychology Hobbes describes, 
reason will simply serve his passions. Hobbes makes no claims for the 
Sovereign's intelligence or rationality. He does not speak of the 
Sovereign thinking but willing. This suggests that perhaps 
consistency and the enforcement of definitions is more important than 
their content. But even the former is not guaranteed. If we find in 
Hobbes' vocabulary examples that are neither reasonable nor 
consistent, the Sovereign might do much worse. 
We began looking at these areas in which language is discussed in 
order to discover if there might be some gaps between the solutions 
Machaivelli and Hobbes offer and the needs or expectations of their 
subjects. Such gaps have begun to emerge. Machaivelli often relies 
upon illusions and fraud within politics - forms of language which 
presume upon a trusting relationship, yet work to destroy it. Tactics 
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like these must balance on the fine line between political expediency 
and the need for a sense of solidarity, or, at the least, security. 
Yet Machiavelli's attitude's toward ordinary language, poetry and law 
prove less problematic than Hobbes'. While Machiavelli does assume a 
separation of the people and their rulers, this is caused by a 
monopoly on privileged information, rather than a fundamentally 
different attitude toward politics, or toward language. But Hobbes is 
describing a political system in which the Sovereign sets up political 
institutions and a vocabulary which involve a different way of looking 
at language. Hobbes demands that people not only change their speech, 
but change the way they think about language. As Norman Jacobson puts 
it, Hobbes wants to provide through language "an incessant structuring 
of the world within and about us. 1134 
Perhaps the largest difference between these two approaches toward 
political language is that Machiavelli openly recognizes the need for 
persuasion when the aims of the princes and the people do not 
coincide. The need for differences to be overcome can be achieved 
much more fruitfully through words than force. Hobbes, on the other 
hand, refuses to openly admit the need for some sort of reconciliation 
between his scientific principles and the everyday situations in which 
they might prove inadequate. �,-'\.,.,.J...,,.,-.-, ·1 
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IV. The Place of Persuasion 
It may seem extraneous to focus on persuasion in the writings of 
two thinkers who are commonly described as primarily concerned with 
technique and method. Sheldon Wolin speaks of Machiavelli as the first 
modern political theorist, offering "the new science of statecraft"1, 
and entitles his chapter on Hobbes "Political Society as a System of 
Rules." Habermas pinpoints Machiavelli as the instigator, and Hobbes as 
the culmination, of a "revolution in approach", rejecting, among other 
classical ideas, the notion that "politics was always directed toward 
the formation and cultivation of character.112 And Leo Strauss, who 
defines political philosophy as the pursuit of "knowledge of the good 
life and of the good society," cites Machiavelli and Hobbes as 
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principle figures in the "degt�,dation of man. n 3 
Is it true that neither Machiavelli nor Hobbes are concerned 
with people's souls, but only with their behavior? In exploring this 
question we will come to the heart of what persuasion is and what it 
does for Machiavelli and Hobbes; where they stand in relation to 
classical rhetoric, and what that relationship can tell us about 
language, knowledge, and trust in politics. For the classical 
theorists, persuasion mediates the gap between the people, governed by 
their passions, and their rulers, who have political wisdom, by 
enabling the people to believe what they cannot know. Right belief 
might have the same content as knowledge, but it is less secure 
because it is not fully grasped or understood. At the root of the 
classical conception of rhetoric is the conviction that people have 
different capacities for wisdom, and that rhetoric provides the means 
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for reaching those who could not rationally understand. As Aristotle 
puts it: 
Rhetoric is useful because • • •  before some audiences, 
not even the possession of the exactest knowledge will 
make it easy for what we say to produce conviction. For 
argument based on knowledge implies instruction, and 
there are people whom one cannot instruct.4 
Although Machiavelli and Hobbes both reject many classical assumptions 
about human psychology, and the nature of politics, conceptions of 
knowledge and passion remain the determining factors in understanding 
the meaning and uses of persuasion. 
While both agree that unruly passions are responsible for the state 
of chaos in which people find themselves, they do not dismiss all 
passions as bad. Yet, not surprisingly, the type of passion each 
admires is diametrically opposed to the other. Hobbes sees the hope and 
basis for good government in the passion for peace, the longing all 
people have for a stable, quiet, trustworthy society in which each 
person can pursue his own private goals. For Machiavelli this would 
signal indolence and corruption. (;'obbes' ideal is in his opinion the 
. r· 
lowest form of government.} Yet Hobbes would think no bettert �5;' 
Machiavelli's favorite passion: public spiritedness. While Machiavelli 
sees in it the source of a strong and vital republic, Hobbes dismisses 
it as vain ambition. 
It is clear that these two thinkers do not use "passion" in the 
same sense. Yet, different as their notions are, they do have similar 
ideas about the relationship of knowledge to passion. For both, the 
intellect is not something that exists above and aloof from the 
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passions, but is intricately connected with them. Hobbes describes 
reason as the servant of the passions. The contract and the recognition 
of the laws of nature, the ultimate expressions of reason, are the 
direct result of the passion for peace. For Machiavelli, political 
knowledge does not arise out of detachment, but from the passionate 
desire to accomplish something, either for the sake of one's country or 
oneself. 
The proper relationship of intellect to passion leads for Hobbes to 
detachment from politics, for Machiavelli, to passionate involvement. 
These, then, would be the ultimate goals for which persuasion could be 
used. Yet because of their fundamentally different views on what 
constitutes knowledge, and how it is attained, persuasion would mean 
something radically different for each. Hobbes, taking geometry for his 
model, progressing from simple to more complex truths, would appeal to 
the reason of his listeners, knowing that infallible logic would lead 
them to accept his conclusions. But for Machiavelli, knowledge means 
not only a wide background in history, but the personal experience and 
perceptiveness to understand what measures are needed in particular 
cirumstances. It is not something that can be easily taught or 
acquired. Thus people must be shown the right beliefs, as one cannot 
expect them to grasp the complexities of the knowledge held by their 
leaders . 
But epistemology is not the only determining factor for styles of 
persuasion. Hobbes and Machiavelli are also addressing very different 
audiences. Writing in the midst of a civil war, Hobbes wants to 
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convince individuals, first, that ito be rational is to be governed by 
self interest, and second, that their self interest lies in the 
maintenance of the established order. Hobbes uses a rational, orderly 
method to convince people to be rational and orderly. Machiavelli has 
/.,.a:·) 
other objectives: to demonst,;Jte his own ability as an astute 
political advisor, to urge for the unification of Italy, and to 
reawaken the striving after ancient virtue. He wants to appeal to the 
self interest of the prince, but also to his vanity and ambition, for 
awakening the longing for glory is the first step toward the imitation 
of ancient virtue. Machiavelli both shocks and captivates his 
audience, almost as though he is daring the prince to be daring, or 
stirring republicans to love their country more than their own souls. 
For Machiavelli, persuasion can take as many forms as there are 
ends for which it is used. Depending on the circumstances, persuasion 
may be the wise counsel of leaders to their people, or a tactic the 
prince uses to safeguard his power, or both. History, as well as being 
the source of knowledge, is also important for producing belief. It 
provides not only examples of technique, but a tradition which may be 
used to strike an emotional chord, evoking a common heritage. 
A free city • • • can always find a motive for rebellion 
in the name of liberty and of its ancient usages • • • 
so long as the inhabitants are not separated or dispersed, 
they do not forget that name, and those usages, but appeal 
to them at once in every emergency.5 
Machiavelli warns that the new prince must always either find a way to 
make an old tradition his own, or destroy it, for it contains powerful 
emotional elements which are remembered and shared by the people. He 
realizes that names and events become symbols for people, symbols that 
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are powerful, and must either be embraced or destroyed. 
The prince uses persuasion to instill in his people the beliefs he 
wants them to have. In war he must overcome his subjects' weariness or 
indifference by "now raising the hopes of his subjects that the evils 
will not last long, now impressing them with fear of the enemy's 
cruelty. 116 The prince works to make himself appear to be trustworthy, 
strong, and good so that his subjects will believe in 
find them even more ma��ble if he can convince them 
interests too are at st�/e. 
him, but he will 
that their 
In a republic, Machiavelli speaks of using persuasion in the 
Aristotelian sense: to lead people to right beliefs. This too may be 
/ manipulative, but any action may be justified by the results it 
produces. A leader may bring a people back to their first principles by 
evoking a sense of loss and of shame, glorifying the past in order to 
move toward a better future. He may also be able to correct people's 
mistaken beliefs, for though they are taken in by appearances, and will 
puruse any plan that promises glory, they can be perceptive when shown 
the particulars of a situation. 
While all persuasion involves an appeal to passion for 
Machiavelli, Hobbes distinguishes between two kinds. One, "an elegant 
and clear expression of the conceptions of the mind," based on 
properly used words, and the other 
A commotion of the passions of the mind • • • derived 
from a metaphorical use of words fitted to the passions. 
That forms a speech from true principles; this from 
opinions already reqeived • • • the art of that is logic, 
of this ?hetoric; the end of that is truth, or this, 
victory. 
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The distinction for Hobbes is perfectly clear: logic is the best form 
of persuasion because it appeals to reason, and reason leads all people 
to the same conclusions, "for all men reason alike and well, when they 
have good principles."8 Most passions lead to strife, smothering 
the voice of reason, so that people act only for their immediate 
gratification, with no thought for their ultimate self-interest. 
Though harshly critical of Aristotle's Politics and Ethics, Hobbes 
conceded that "his Rhetorique was rare."9 Perhaps one reason for his 
admiration is that in the Rhetoric, Aristotle recognizes that "men are 
persuaded by considerations of their interest, and their interest lies 
in the maintenance of the established order.nlO 
The skill of producing conviction in people, usually for a 
particular end, is best judged by the results it produces. We can 
better understand the preconceptions and ultimate interests that lie 
behind notions of persuasion in Machiavelli and Hobbes by looking at 
some areas in which it proves a problematic issue. 
Religious Interpretation 
Both Machiavelli and Hobbes had strong criticisms of the religious 
practices of their time. They felt these practices inculcated the wrong 
values in the people, values which proved dangerous to the welfare of 
the state. Recognizing the power that religion represented, both wanted 
that power to be instituted in such a way as to strengthen and unify the 
state. 
Machiavelli criticized the Christianity of his day for teaching 
people to hold the fate of their souls as more important than the fate 
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of their country. They become weak, disinterested ·in public affairs, 
and "easy prey to evil minded men, who control them more securely.1111 
Interestingly, he does not condemn Christianity itself, but the way it 
has been interpreted. His creative and pragmatic streak will not allow 
him to abandon such a powerful source so easily. If thousands of people 
are Christians, they cannot be easily . persuaded to reject their 
religion. Perhaps if it were interpreted differently, they could be 
taught to be more worthy citizens, and still call themselves Christians. 
Machiavelli pinpoints the fault of Christianity in "the baseness of men, 
who have interpreted our religion according to the promptings of 
indolence rather than those of virtue."12 
Both The Prince and The Discourses give examples of how 
Christianity might be so interpreted. To S!,E.E!SS his point that 
opponents of the law must be silenced or killed in order to maintain 
peace, he remarks: 
Whoever reads the Bible attentively will find that 
Moses, for the purpose of insuring the observance of 
his laws and institutions was obliged to have a great 
many persons put to death who opposed his designs.13 
Throughout the Prince Moses is described with admiration from a 
secular point of view, compared with pagan leaders, and judged as a 
man with an extraordinary capacity for leadership. At another point, 
Machiavelli cites the story of David and Goliath to illustrate the 
importance of fighting with one's own arms, no matter how small or 
inadequate they may seem. He can find plenty of material in the Bible 
(especially by ignoring the New Testament) to provide authority for 
his political advice. 
3 9  
Machiavelli's views on religious interpretation are developed 
further when he discusses the pagan religion of Rome. Early on in The 
Discourses, he devotes four chapters to it, stressing that religion is 
"the most necessary and assured support of any civil society."14 It is 
not necessary that the leaders of a republic believe, but that they 
feign belief, and use religion to further their own purposes. "There 
never was any remarkable lawgiver amongst any people who did not resort 
to divine authority, as otherwise his laws would not have been accepted 
by the people. 1115 
People are naturally superstitious- it is easy to make them 
religious believers, and once they are, they can be easily controlled 
and disciplined in the name of the gods. Machiavelli has no problem 
with religion making people into "easy prey", he simply wants a 
different sort of prey, more appropriate for his ideal republic. His 
religion would not encourage privatization, so that a prince could 
easily control the state, but would combine religion with patriotism, 
making people more anxious to march off to war. The Roman practice of 
manipulating the auspices before battles, telling the soldiers they were 
favorable, when in fact they were not, is an example Machiavelli quotes 
with approval, for "this system had [no] other object thaan to inspire 
the soldiers on the eve of battle with that confidence which is the 
surest guarantee of victory."16 
For Machiavelli, religious interpretation is not held above "the 
end justifies the means" formula. Indeed, this maxim is all the more 
applicable because there is so much at stake. While he does not discuss 
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the crusades, surely they reinforced his belief that religion is perhaps 
the surest way of obtaining the passionate obedience of a people. 
Hobbes, on the contrary, seeks to interpret religion to quiet the 
passions. He wages a religious war on two fronts, against the 
papacy, and against the sects which claimed divine inspiration 
contrary to Anglican teachings. Both represented a threat to the 
authority of the Sovereign. While Catholicism required temporal 
obedience to the Pope, thereby splitting a subject's loyalties, sects 
which claimed to communicate directly with God, and to hold obedience 
to Him over their duties to the civil Sovereign gave subjects a divine 
sanctions for disobedience. 
In order to combat this heresy, Hobbes offers his own understanding 
of what constitutes a properly Christian commonwealth. Naturally, he 
begins by examining the vocabulary of those who claim divine 
inspiration. Focusing on the word spirit, Hobbes argues that the word 
does not refer to an "incorporeal body", for these words taken together 
are absurd. Rather, "spirit" is simply an indication of God's power 
working in a way we cannot understand. Hobbes attacks private 
inspiration both as a form of madness, a result of the vanity of men who 
think themselves worthy to speak directly with God. These criticisms 
reveal Hobbes dual reaction to this phenomena. One the one hand, he 
considers such inspiration foolish and irrational, based on a false 
understanding of words, and therefore comtemptible. But he also 
recognizes such sects as a powerful and dangerous force of rebellion. 
As an alternative, Hobbes insists that "the nature of God is 
incomprehensible; that is to say, we understand nothing of what he is, 
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but only that he is.017 In refusing to discuss the nature of God, 
Hobbes shifts the emphasis to the historical record of God's actions in 
the world, and the actions of people who have believed in Him. "The 
Scripture was written to shew unto men the kingdom of God and to prepare 
their minds to become his obedient subjects. 1118 Just as Christianity 
is an affirmation of the acts God has performed, and the promises He 
has made, the subject's duty is to obey the laws of his Sovereign in 
all his actions. What is actually believed is left entirely up to the 
individual, as long as contrary opinions are not expressed. 
A private man has always the liberty, because thought is 
free, to believe or not believe in his heart • • •  But 
when it comes to confession of that faith, the private 
reason must submit to the public, that is to say, 
God's lieutenant.19 
God's lieutenant must be the Sovereign, for in all the history of God's 
kingdom "the supremacy of religion was in the same hand with that of the 
civil sovereignty. 1120 
Early on in Leviathan, Hobbes drily defines religion as "tales 
publically allowed1121 and deplores superstition: 
If this superstitious fear of spirits were taken away, 
• • •  by which crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple 
people, men would be much more fitted than they are for 
civil obedience. 2 2 
Here, it seems Hobbes would class Machiavelli's leaders as "crafty 
ambitious persons", and would much prefer people clearly guided by 
reason, understanding precisely the reasons why they should obey, and 
why they should worship as the Sovereign does. Christianity must be 
recognized as a different kind of knowledge: the word of God revealed 
through the prophets and interpreted by the Sovereign. It cannot be 
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understood as science can, but must be accepted through faith. This 
emphasis on faith, rather than seeing God in terms of human reason, as 
the Deists did, illustrates that religion is distinct from what can be 
known through science. But it is still, for Hobbes, as well as for 
Machiavelli a wealth of material, authoritative and familiar to all, 
that could be made politically instructive. 
Where religious interpretation in concerned, Machiavelli and 
Hobbes are more alike than they are different. Religion is a kind of 
raw power, a force that touches people on a fundamental level, and one 
that is all the stronger for not being rationally examined. For all 
Hobbes' reasoning and explicating, stories like that of the Fall, and 
of Job are calculated to touch a chord of awe and fear. When this 
response is shared, religion can be far more powerful than mere self 
interest, for it can persuade people to act both unselfishly and 
communally to accomplish what their leaders deem necessary for the 
salvation of their souls. 
Private Opinion 
While religion may unify a people, enabling them to share a 
collective set of beliefs, private opinions are those that are neither 
official doctrine nor necessarily shared, but are personal. The 
classic defense of freedom of speech, made by John Stuart Mill, argues 
that a diversity of opinions not only strengthens a society, but is 
necessary for the development of theindividual. It enables him to 
develop a distinctive voice through self expression, and his faculties 
of judgement through listening to others. But Mill is not a theorist 
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of power. He envisions an open marketplace of ideas in society rather 
than a state in which freedom of speech could pose a serious threat to 
political order. Certainly he is never put in the position of 
deciding between free speech and peace. What place does personal 
expression have in theory primarily concerned with order? 
Machiavelli, as the style of his writing clearly attests, felt a 
wide variety of opinion to be a sign of a healthy vital state. 
Reflecting upon Roman history, he speaks of a ngolden age when every one 
could hold and defend whatever opinion he pleased. 1123 He insists upon 
7 the importance of open procedures so that citizens may freely speak 
their minds about other citizens or policies. For when outlets such as 
these are not provided, passions will burst out in more dangerous ways. 
But more important than simply providing a safety valve, free 
speech gives a republic the advantage of the wisdom of all the minds 
that make themselves heard. "To advise men to be silent and to withhold 
the expression of any opinion would render them useless to a 
republic.n24 Still, though wise counsel makes for a healthy state, it 
is not always conducive to the health of the counselor. Machiavelli 
warns that counselors, even in corrupt principalities should be given 
leave to speak freely, but from their point of view this is not always 
wise. In advocating a certain policy, they may find themselves punished 
for its failure. In a principality, none but the privileged would dare 
openly speak their minds in opposition to the prince, and these would do 
so only with the strictest care. 
Machiavelli would not offer much succor to the idealist who held 
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his beliefs more important than his safety. An ardent republican 
himself, he wrote The Prince to gain favor with Lorenzo di Medici after -
w 
� the republican coup with which he had sympathizet, failed. For him, 
being useful was more important than holding on to ideals in idleness. 
Holding on to ideals when decisive and perhaps cruel measures are called 
for is equally inadequate. Machiavelli describes Pietro Soderini, who 
believed he could rule through "patience and gentleness" in a state with 
dangerous enemies, as "the dupe of his opinions. n25 The freedom to 
hold and act upon one's opinions is admired, but like all other 
admirable qualities, must adjust itself to time and circumstance. 
Hobbes is most sensitive to private opinion in the form of 
sectarian religious beliefs, but is also keenly attuned to the dangers 
of private opinion in other forms as well. For him, conscientious 
objection to the laws of the commowealth would be a contradiction in 
terms, for "law is the public conscience, by whi�he subj�W,,, __ hath 
already undertaken to be guided. 1126 Hobbes speaks of law as a the 
expression . of reason, and reason as "certain", "scientific" and 
"infallible". Knowledge is unquestionable, dissension is a sign of 
ignorance . 
Because Hobbes envisions a close relationship between theory and 
practice, he is wary of differing opinions, "The actions of men proceed 
from their opinions; and in the well governing of opinions, consisteth 
the well governing of men's actions.1127 He does not consider the 
possibility that people might learn from each other, for knowledge can 
only be attained through the scientific method. But before knowledge 
can be acquired, false opinions must be rooted out, and the mind cleared 
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of all nonsense so that true knowledge may be understood without the 
challenge of misguided beliefs. 
Both Machiavelli and Hobbes are unconcerned with the notion that 
free speech is essential for personal development. When a diversity 
of opinions is valued, as in Machiavelli's republic, this is because 
it strengthens the state as well as its citizens. While both thinkers 
stress the importance of educating subjects and citizens, the freedom 
to discuss a variety of ideas is not considered important for 
political instruction. 
Education 
Education, for Machiavelli and Hobbes, means teaching people to 
be good subjects and citizens. Both thinkers conceive of education as 
the process of teaching people correc values 1 What values are to be 
taught, and how? The classical theorists saw education as working 
toward the perfection of the individual soul, and the unity and 
harmony of the polis, for the two were seen as directly reiG 
Each person had a particular place to fill in the polis, and education 
prepared them for that place. What does education do for 
Machiavelli's and Hobbes' subjects? What sort of knowledge does it 
provide? Does teaching people to be good citizens make them better 
people? 
The topic of education is entirely omitted from The Prince. 
Where there is no public life, there is no need for education. But in 
a republic, education is essential. For Machiavelli, the goal of 
education is "to enable (people) to know the world better, and to 
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teach them to be less elated in good fortune, and less depressed by 
adversity."28 Education teaches temperance, it teaches people to 
quell their passions so they may look beyond the sensations of the 
present. Machiavelli most often speaks of education in terms of 
learning restraint, much as the Greeks spoke of conquering the 
passions and living moderately. Yet moderation must never be taken so 
far as passivity. 
act decisively. 
The ideal citizen is one who can think clearly, and 
� �.._,..., (., ,- ,_() 
Though Machiavelli recognizes the educational power of literature 
and drama, in The Discourses his discussion of education focuses 
almost entirely on military training rather than cultural factors. 
Education does not involve the pursuit of wisdom, but the formation of 
a certain character. The ideal citizen is valorous without being 
arrogant. This training can only be done by one who is both respected 
and admired, a leader who wins hearts through his words and deeds. 
"For nothing so certainly secures • • •  the public esteem as some such 
remarkable action or saying that • • •  is of a nature to become 
familiar as a proverb among the subjects."29 Citizens are best taught 
by example. 
For Hobbes, education is simply "the instruction of the people in 
the essential rights which are the natural and fundamental laws of 
sovereignty."30 It is essential that they understand, for left in 
ignorance, people could easily be seduced into believing dangerous 
doctines. People would be forced to acknowledge these laws as necessary 
if they honestly looked into their own hearts. But their passions and 
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secret thoughts are easily kept from them, as "the characters of a man's 
heart are blotted and confounded with dissembling, lying, 
counterfeiting and erroneous doctines. 1131 Because people are so adept 
at avoiding the truth about themselves, self education is not an option. 
It is annexed to the sovereignty to be judge of what 
opinions and doctrines are averse, and what conducing 
to peace; and consequently what men are trusted withal 
in speaking to multitudes of people, and who shall 
examine t�! doctrines of all books before they are 
published. 
Fortunately, education is as simple as telling people what their duties 
are: "an unpreducated man needs no more to learn it than to hear 
it. 1133 The key for Hobbes is that all are educated. He suggests 
calling people to �her weekly to have their duties read to them, as 
well as having the rules of sovereignty taught to the young in 
universities. 
Hobbes is confident that, once led to an understanding of their 
true self interest, people will not hesitate to accept the necessity 
of the Sovereign. "The common people's minds ••• are like clean 
/7", 
paper, fit to rei7,'7e whatsoever by public authority shall be 
imprinted in them.034 Not only will they be taught to obey all of the 
laws of nature, but they will be taught "to do all this sincerely from 
the heart ••• for not only the unjust facts, but the designs and 
intentions to do them, though by accident hindered are injustice.035 
Here again the double meaning of "justice" surfaces. Hobbes has 
made it clear that justice can only apply to actions, yet here he 
breaks from his emphasis on behavior to intentions. He clearly saw 
that actions are motivated by the thoughts behind them, the reason for 
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his insistance that the Sovereign must decide what doctrines may or 
may not be taught. Yet he also insists that thought is free. Can 
these two assertions be made compatible? 
Are Hobbes and Machiavelli interested in changing people's souls? 
Both of them, for all their emphasis on action and motion, see people's 
minds as surprisingly passive. They do not take part in their own 
education, but are molded by their leaders into the desired shape. 
The active critical questioning of the Socratic method, for example, 
--��----"""" 
would be foreign to both educational f s;stem��) Quoting Cicero with 
approval, Machiavelli notes: "The people, though ignorant, yet are 
capable of appreciating the truth, and yield to it readily when it is 
presented to them by a man whom they esteem worthy of their 
confidence. 1136 Hobbes, though criticizing mere belief for its 
passivity, still implies a difference from the active and rigorous 
science of politics, and the precepts of reason as discovered by the 
people. Metaphors like "minds like clean paper, fit to receive", and 
the fact that the end of reason is passive obedience, seem strangely 
inconsonant with his assertions that knowledge is active and seeking. 
For though it is, it can only seek one answer; that answer discovered, 
knowledge ceases to be of further use. 
Both thinkers obviously expect people to change under good 
government. But how radical is this change? Machiavelli speaks of 
bringing political and religious institutions back to "first 
principles." He outlines, almost in mythic form, the origins of 
government, when people chose the wisest and most just to be their 
leaders. The return to first principles involves a people becoming 
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again what they once were. But this formula means that only those 
cities that have a history of liberty may recapture that liberty. 
Cities that have corrupt origins are destined to remain corrupt, unless, 
by some amazing chance, a good man emerges who has the power and skill 
to institute liberty, and reform the people so they may guard that 
liberty after his death. But Machiavelli admits "I know not whether 
/� 1 
such a case has ever(�/
ed, or whether it possibily ever could 
occur."37 History once again proves essential. It not only contains 
the past, but also the future, for the future must spring from the past. 
Machiavelli cannot be credited or accused of changing people's souls. 
He simply describes the changes that necessarily take place, just as 
events take place. History's cycles bring different forms of government 
to the fore, and the character of a people may shape, and be shaped by 
those forms of government. 
Hobbes argues that he is not trying to change people's souls at 
all. He points out again and again that thought is free, and that no 
one, save God, can judge a man's beliefs. Civil laws are not 
instituted 
to bind the people from all voluntary actions, but 
to direct and keep them in such a motion, as not to 
not to hurt themselves by their own rashness or 
indiscretion, as hedges are set� not to stop travellers, 
but to keep them in their way.30 
I have already noted the remarks on education that must be placed in the 
balance with comments like these. How are these different factors to 
be weighed? Perhaps the best way of examining the kinds of changes 
Hobbes and Machiavelli intend, or must necessarily entail, is to 
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imagine their subjects' response to their doctrines. Would they 
consent to live in such a state? Would they support such rulers? 
Would they be convinced? 
t( 
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V.  The People's Perspective 
In Lying, Sissela Bok draws out the moral issues implicit in 
deception by exploring the radically different perceptions of the liar 
and the lied to. While the liar can always justify his deceptions, 
naturally assigning to himself the most benevolent and rational motive, 
the one who has been de(Qed often cares very little about motive at 
all, but feels betrayed by such a deliberate breach of trust. This 
emphasis on perspective can illuminate many other areas in which 
language is used. Since Machiavelli and Hobbes both write from the 
privileged perspective of those in power, we must look at their ideas 
from the other side, from the perspective of the people, in order to get 
a complete understanding of the kind of relationship each describes 
between the leaders and the people of a state. 
I have described how Machiavelli advocates manipulative tactics, 
even in states where citizens are uncorrupted, and genuinely seeking to 
serve the republic. He justifies himself by arguing that: 
The great majority of mankind are satisfied with 
appearances, as though they were realities, and are 
often even more influenced by the things that seem, 
than by things that are.1 
People are so often blind, they may prefer actions that seem courageous 
and bold, refusing to recognize that such plans are also foolish and 
dangerous. People need to be guided1 yet, governed by their passions, 
they may refuse to accept good counsel. For Machiavelli, deceptions are 
necessary. If the people insist upon looking at illusions rather than 
reality, then the most constructive illusions should be created for them 
to believe in. While reputations are carefully created, essential 
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information withheld, or religious auspices "interpreted", people remain 
oblivious to the machinations behind the scenes, accepting actions and 
events for what they appear to be. 
But Machiavelli also realizes the dangers of this course. 
The people often, deceived by an illusive good, 
desire their own ruin, and, unless they are made 
sensible of the evil of the one, and the benefit of 
the other course, by someone in whom they have 
confidence, they will expose 'the republic to infinite 
peril and damage. And if it happens that the people 
have no confidence in any one, as sometimes will 
be the case when they have been deceived before by 
events or men, then it will inevitably lead to the 
ruin of the state. 2 
In order for the people to be guided, they must respect and trust their 
leaders. Yet deception itself works to destroy trust. 
The leaders of a republic would doubtless argue that these 
deceptions were only practiced for the right reasons. On these grounds, 
Sheldon Wolin formulates a convincing and positive reading of 
Machiavelli: since politics for him is necessarily concerned with the 
administration of violence, he is trying to formulate guidelines for 
"the economy of violence." It is tragic that violence, and, I shall 
add, fraud, must be a part of politics, but they are necessary, and to 
renounce them is to cause even more harm. It is the political leader's 
challenge to accept fraud and violence as the tools he must use, and to 
do his best to use them responsibly. 
Yet Bok would question the notion that benevolent motives are 
enough to justify such acts. The leaders may give themselves the 
benefit of the doubt when examining their own motives, but the people 
are harldly in a position to do this. Ultimately, Machiavelli is 
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describing a state based upon a double standard: the people must trust, 
but are not to be trusted. With this assumption at the core of even the 
most vital republic, how substantive can its claims to a public life be? 
Machiavelli argues that this assumption is not a matter of choice: 
many have imagined republics and principalities 
have never beeen see, or known to exist in reality; 
for how we live is so far removed from how we ought 
to live, that he who abandons what is done, for 
what ought to be done will rather learn to bring 
about his own ruin than his preservation.3 
He holds that it is simply a matter of fact that people need illusions. 
Yet his description of the loss of confidence and the sense of betrayal 
people feel when they discover deceptions argues that whether or not 
people have the capacity for knowing it, they expect to be told the 
truth. 
At first glance, Machiavelli's republic seems worlds away from the 
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principalities he describes.
,lt�
eople are not afraid to speak out, to 
voice their opinions, to debate in the political arena. Everyone's 
voice is recognized, and all are encouraged to make themselves heard. 
But free speech and the right to take part in decision making are 
empty if people are not granted access to the information necessary to 
make these choices. If people cannot ultimately be trusted to take 
part in governing themselves, · then a republic is not qualitatively 
different from a principality, 
For government consists mainly in so keeping your 
subjects that they shall be neither able, nor 
nor disposed to injure you; and this is done by 
depriving them of all means of injuring you, or by 
bestowing such benefits upon them that it would 
not be riasonable for them to desire any change of 
fortune. 
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While Machiavelli considers people "uncorrupted" in a republic, this is 
not the same good life toward which the polis aimed, for the 
improvement of the citizenry is always incidental to the true aim of all 
that Machiavelli advocates: the preservation of power. 
In Hobbes, the central issue from the subject's perspective is "Did 
I really consent?" Given the degree of obligation which consent 
entails, it is extremely important that each subject consider himself to 
have consented. Hobbes describes two types of consent: by institution 
or by conquest. He also makes the distinction between express and tacit 
consent, yet this latter distinction does not necessarily correspond to 
the first. In short it is not always clear exactly what constitutes 
consent. 
One the one hand, Hobbes stresses the express, verbal nature of 
consent, arguing "no man can compact with him who doth not declare his 
acceptance. 115 This explains why the notion of consent is limited to 
man alone, and why men cannot covenant with beasts. But Hobbes also 
argues that because •ipreservation of life being the end for which one 
man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise 
obedience to him in whose power it is to save or destroy him."6 Here 
consent is assumed when one party is obviously at the mercy of the 
other, even if nothing is said. This is considered to be tacit 
consent, which may be 
sometimes the consequence of words, sometimes the 
consequence of silence, sometimes the consequence of 
actions, sometimes the consequence of forbearing an 
action, and generally a sign by inference is whatsoever 
sufficiently argues the will of the contractor.7 
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This definition is extraordinarily vague and broad by Hob6)usually 
precise standards. Yet he argues that it is just as valid and binding 
as express consent. By arguing that consent may take either of these 
forms, Hobbes can stress the deliberateness and bindingness of the 
act, while at the same time extending it to all the people living 
within a commonwealth who have never expressly consented to the 
compact . 
Naturally, the latter category is far larger than the first. They 
are assumed to have consented because they live under the protection of 
the Sovereign. 
The obligation of a servant to his lord ariseth 
not from simple grant of his life, but from hence 
further, that he keeps him not bound or imprisoned. 
For all obligation derives from contract, but 
where there is no trust, there can be no contract 
• • •  There is therefore, a confidence and trust 
which accompanies the benefit of pardoned life, 
whereby the lord affords him his corporal liberty1 
so that if no obligation nor bonds of contract had 
happened, he might not only have made his escape, 
but also have killed his lord, who was the preserver 
of his life. 8 
The use of an analogy to illustrate this point is interesting, for it 
draws on several assumptions that Hobbes does not explicate in his 
analysis of consent. By bringing the situation down to the individual 
level, the master/servant analogy assumes that: 1) the question of 
whether the servant actually verbally consented is unimportant. 
2) the master could have chosen to imprison the servant, while in a 
commonwealth, this would not necessarily be a realistic option. In a 
large and complex state, a person could, with relative ease, take 
advantage of the benefits of society while bearing none of the costs. 
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3) That there is a trusting relationship between the servant and his 
master . 
The notion of trust fits very uneasily into Hobbes' system. Trust 
refers to a feeling of certainty, a faith in the judgement and actions 
of another. But for a rational, self interested person, there must be a 
reason for trusting another. The Sovereign, insofar as he is an 
artificial personyas no need of trust, for he embodies the wills of all 
his subjects. Insofar as he is a natural person, he is more likely to 
trust his own power more than the good will of his subjects, for Hobbes 
makes clear that the Sovereign does not have more natural rights than 
his subjects, but that he is the only one who does not renounce them. 
Hobbes also argues that the people trust the Sovereign. "There can 
be no contract where there is no trust" refers to trust on both sides 
that it will be kept. Be refers to the Sovereign's violations of 
natural law as breaches of trust. But people have no reason to trust 
the Sovereign. He does not contract with them. They have no assurance 
that he will rule them wisely and fairly, and perhaps most importantly, 
there is no personal connection between the Sovereign and his subjects. 
The Sovereign is not a leader, but a device for unifying many wills into 
one. Trust requires some knowledge of the object of faith, either in 
the charater of a ruler, or in the nuetral structure of the political 
system. Hobbes' Sovereign offers neither. 
Then why does Hobbes speak of trust? It is plainly at odds with 
his principles of self interest, for no viable explanation has been 
offered as to why subjects should trust their Sovereign. The reason no 
such explanation is offered is because there is none. The Sovereign is 
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bound to his subjects by natural law, just as all natural men are bound 
to each other. But there is no earthly reason why he should respect 
those laws. Hobbes appeals to trust to try to provide an emotionally 
satisfying answer where no logical one can be found. But trust is a 
strangely empty concept when Hobbes speaks of it, for his subjects have 
no shared life, no common culture, and no common goals. Trust cannot 
appeal to shared values, nor can it appeal to any personal confidence in 
the Sovereign, for he is not a leader, but an "artificial man." 
Trust, then, is not so much an actual condition to which Hobbes 
refers, but a concept that is used to buttress the nebulous notion of vf 
consent. Not only should the people trust their Sovereign, 
unquestioningly accepting the mysterious grounds of their "consent", but 
Hobbes argues in the passage above that having been trusted by the 
Sovereign �onstitutes consent. Consent then becomes not simply 
passive and silent, but entirely removed from the hands of the subject. 
Hobbes' educational program brings out another facet in the issue 
of consent: would people consent to be so governed if they knew they 
were going to be changed? For while Hobbes argues that he is merely 
making hedges, he also asserts that reason can only be heard by those 
I 
whose passions have been quieted, that in a monarchy "only the ambitious 
suffer; the rest are protected from the injuries of the more potent,"9 
and that people must learn to obey all of the laws of nature "from the 
heart." Yet at the outset, Hobbes posited that one reason it was 
possible to have a science of politics is because man's psychological 
nature is constant. The "general inclination of all mankind" is a 
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desire for power "that ceaseth only in death.1110 How then can Hobbes 
expect men to agree to have their ambitions quieted? 
Hobbes changes his description of the conditions of the contract. 
He argues that rational people would agree to a negative version of 
the golden rule: do not do that to others, which you would not have 
them do unto you. But, though the contract would be made on these 
grounds, in effect people would have relinquished all power over their 
lives, their relationships to each other, their minds and their words 
- everything except their bodies, for the "liberty of subjects 
dependeth on the silence of the law.1111 All this could be done 
without any subject uttering a word, according to the notion of tacit 
consent, for the emphasis has shifted from the subject's will to the 
r, context in which a persors f1Ct1ons or silences must be construed. To 
_,, 
convince readers of the truth of his doctrine, Hobbes urges "read 
thyself", but in view of the ends of his commonwealth, "revise 
thyself" would be a more appropriate motto. 
In this section I have explored the subject's awareness of how he 
is being ruled, and how he is personally affected by his government. It 
is very possible that a perceptive and critical subject might never 
consent or lend his support to the type of government described by 
Machiavelli or Hobbes. But it is equally possible that he might never 
perceive any of the "gaps" I have described, and live perfectly 
contented in such a state. After all, Machiavelli gives much advice to 
the prince and the leaders of a republic about how to appear toward the 
people. Why wouldn't a talented and charismatic ruler succeed in 
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weaving these illusions? As for Hobb_es' subjects, if they were educated 
as thoroughly as he describes, they would never have enough distance 
from the political system to quesiton it. Critical distance would be 
eradicated by the institution of scientific language.* 
If subjects have no complaints about the ways in which language is 
being used, must we then conclude, with Weber, that the government is 
acting legitimately? Hanna Pitkin points out the obvious problem with 
this stance. 
Guch a definition would m�?q} �hat a government may 
become increasingly legitimate by the judicious and 
efficient use of secret police and propaganda. Which 
seems about as accurate as that one can increase the 
validity of an !rgument by threatening to shoot anyone 
who disagrees.1 
Machiavelli's and Hobbes' manipulation of language is even more 
insidious, for while holding a gun on someone is a blatant threat of 
violence, their use of language, when most effective, would be least 
perceived. Is it possible to find standards for the use of language 
outside of the perceptions of the people in the state? 
*The word tyranny provides an example. Hobbes describes it as the term 
used to refer to monarchy by its enemies. This word would disappear 
from "scientific" language. In this sense, Orwell's New speak is 
remeniscent of Hobbes' language. The key is not so much inventing new 
words as removing problematic ones. 
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VI. The Search for Standards -- --
What is implied in the assumption that people themselves are not 
the best judges of their own situation? Does it entail ascribing to 
them a kind of "false consciousness", revealing the same sort of latent 
contempt for their natural judgement that Machiavelli and Hobbes both 
use to justify their manipulation of language? It need not. Realizing 
the limitations of people within a certain situation does not mean 
ascribing those limitations to human nature as they do. 
These two thinkers represent two opposite ends of the spectrum 
where the use of language is concerned. Machiavelli does not always 
respect the ordinary limitations we put upon language in advocating 
fraud and deception. Bok describes lying as ana�ous to violence 
because it comes from outside the realm of acceptable social 
intercourse. While creativity may challenge people's expectations, it 
does not violate the basic assumptions people must make in order to 
communicate with each other. To borrow Wittgenstein's metaphor, if 
language is a series of games, deceptions are a refusal to play by the 
rules. 
But where is the line to be drawn between creativity and 
deception? Both violate people's "assumptions" at some level, and 
both are connected to our ability to imagine something other than what 
is. But, to return to the game metaphor, rules need not be prescribed 
beforehand. They can be made up as we go along - as long as there is 
a recognition that this is what is being done. The crucial difference 
between creativity and deception is that the latter involves a 
deliberate intent to mislead rather than challenge other people. All 
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societies must operate on the assumption that people are telling the 
truth. Without this assumption, all communication would degenerate 
into absurdity. We must have a natural duty to play by t;Jstic 
rules because society could not exist without them. Hobbes is correct 
in observing that without trust there can be no relationships. The 
very fact that Machiavelli needs to urge leaders to use deception, to 
"learn how not to be good" amounts to a recognition that speaking 
truthfully is the natural state of affairs. 
Hobbes goes to the other extreme. In seeking to impose order upon 
chaotic natural language, he strips words of their resonance and 
richness, and language of its full capacity for meaning. He tries to 
reduce words to one particular meaning in order to eliminate ambiguity, 
not recognizing that a multiplicity of ideas and explanations is not the 
fault of language, but a characteristic of the human mind. It does not, 
Ir .. -1. tu. ,J.-1�,- ·-· f. , as Hobbes thought, operate solely on one track. 
· ,  -· 1.�v- � .  �- , 
Both thinkers circumvent people's ability to communicate. While 
Hobbes' scientific language would deprive people of the possibility of 
expressing themselves, Machivelli's deceptions focus on preventing 
people from having the opportunity to do so. These problems point to 
the types of standards that must be found. 
Hanna Pitkin sets forth criteria for insuring that language retains 
its possibilities, its full capacity for expression of thought. While 
words may fail us, or simply be inadequate in a given situation, 
language as a whole must always be able to refer to possibilities 
outside of what is. The concept of justice, for example, 
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includes in all of us, both form and substance, 
both conventionalized social practices, and an 
idea that is an ideal by which to measure them • 
• • • We are always potentially able to pry the 
idea loose from some parti�ular example, and 
reasses its applicability. 
This is precisely what Hobbes removes from his vocabulary - the 
elasticity that allows concepts to refer both to what is, and to what 
could or ought to be. In silencing private conscience, Hobbes not only 
deprived personality and creativity of a vocabulary, but also morality, 
for in collapsing civil and moral law, he does not unify and strengthen 
them both, as he sought to do, but deprive the former of the needed 
criticism of the latter. 
Machiavelli controls the opportunity for speech in a principality 
through threats of violence, and in a republic through manipulation of 
information. Even when people have an open forum in which to speak, 
this is not a true opportunity for expression if they are deprived of 
the information necessary for an intelligent, rational decision. The 
assumption of a psychological makeup common to all persons that 
Machiavelli posits is forgotten when he begins to speak of political 
action. Fascination with strategy leads him to place far less emphasis 
on public trust that is actually needed. The constant references to 
nthe peoplen reveal a mass analysis rather than thinking of citizens as 




Bok argues for a standard of publicity for all lies, requiring that 
good reasons be given for deceptions, and asking whether a group of 
rational persons would condone lying in a particular situation. If 
information must be concealed, or lies told for public safety, rulers 
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would at least be guided by what people deemed to be acceptable action 
under the cirumstances. All forms of deceptions need not be eliminated, 
but they must be discussed, prior to any actual situation in which they 
might be used. 
For Machiavelli does not realize the harm lies can do. He thinks 
of them entirely in terms of what they are able to accomplish, not 
recognizing how they affect both the liar and those lied to. While he 
warns that the discovery of deceptions may lead to the dissolution of 
the state, his worry is the harm done to the rulers' power, and not to 
the relationship between people and rulers itself. 
As Sara &mer points out, •corruption" for Machiavelli 
represents privatization, self interest at its worst. It suggests an 
actual physical or chemical change in the matter of the republic. But 
lying, even when it is done out of altruistic motives, is one of the 
most selfish acts a political leader can perform. Be is reserving the 
right to know the truth for himself, while denying it to all others. 
Bok, in exploring the meaning of the word "integrity", discovers its 
links to the idea of being untouched or intact, referring to the 
notion that lying harms those that engage in it. Unless standards for 
deception can be set, lying does harm, for by virtue of the power and 
the isolation it bestows on the liar, it corrupts him. 
But different as Machiavelli and Hobbes' approaches are in these 
areas, both of them share one basic assumption that is at the root of 
their conceptions of language, and is the source of their shortcomings. 
Both thinkers see language as a tool, an external faculty that is used 
for translating thoughts into spoken words. Wittgenstein's insight was 
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to point out that language is also an activity. It is something we do ) 
something that comes out of who we are, and the situation in which we 
find ourselves. The metaphor of language games illuminates not only 
language's active character, but also the idea that it has structure, 
though rules for the use of language may vary from game to game. 
Language can neither be codified into one game where all the rules are 
prescribed, nor can it be spoken with no standards at all. 
A major consequence of Hobbes' and Machiavelli's view of langauge 
as external, as a tool to be used, is that they see thought as 
separate and distinct from words. For Hobbes, people are considered 
to be .free becuase they may think whatever they wish, though their 
speech is strictly controlled. In Machiavelli's case, lies and 
deceptions may be advocated, for what is and what seems to be (i.e. 
what is the truth, and what is said) remain distinct in the mind of 
the political actor. The mind of the liar is considered to be 
unaffected by what he utters. In addition to Bok's criticism of this 
point, Hannah Arendt notes, "under fully democratic conditionsi_ --- - = = �-�  
deception without self-deception is well nigh impossible."3 This 
assumption of a gulf between thoughts and words attacks communication 
on two basic levels: thoughts may no1: .. !?,e-P-e{mi tted to be expressed, 
and words may be spoken in order fto\�:libera��lY, . mislead, obscuring 
the thoughts of the speaker. 
v' J'\! 
Rousseau's view on words and thoughts in politics poses a direct 
alternative to this view. In order for the Gener;al Will to emerge, 
each person must vote for what he truly believes is the General will. 
65 
It must be "general in its object as well as its essence."4 This 
concern with "essence" reveals Rousseau's emphasis on the importance 
of motivation as well as the content of each individual's expression. 
Both are necessary, and must be consonant for the General Will to 
emerge. Examining the adaptation of this idea in the French 
Revolution, Arendt points out the disastrous effects ofQncluding the ? 
private realm of thoughts within politics) 
The search for motives, the demand that everybody display 
in public his innermost motivation, since it actually 
demands the impossible, transforms all actors into 
hypocrites 1 the moment the display of motives be�ins, 
hypocrisy begins to poison all human relations. 
Clearly this opposite extreme is no alternative. Political speech 
must continue to allow for discretion, self imposed silence, and for 
the protection of the personal. But between these two poles there 
must be a middle ground in which language. can do justice to personal 
expression, and to the basic expectations we bring to any interchange. 
Defining this ground is something that must be done within the context 
of a political situation, by the people involved, but it must involve 
a departure from the idea that language is simply a tool we use. 
The notion of language as a tool led Machiavelli and Hobbes to see 
the vast creative potential in language. Viewing the relationship of 
man to man as naturally chaotic and dangerous, they saw the possibility 
of imposing order through language. Both sought to harness the 
passions of men through language in order to generate a strong central 
power that could be used to control them. Language was to be used to 
battle the unknown, to conquer fortune and the heart of darkness that 
lies within the passions of man. For Machiavelli, this meant creating 
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illusions and deceptions. The prince, as author of these fantasies, has 
utter control over them. He can mold and shape them in order to form 
the epic of history. For Hobbes, it meant creating a new language, 
fashioning the definitions of words so that all would know exactly what 
they meant. Fiction and artificiality must be constructed by the ruler, 
for he can ony truly understand and control what he has made. 
Both Machiavelli's and Hobbes' manipulation of language stems from 
their search for certainty in an uncertain world. If one can only 
understand what one creates, language cannot be governed by common use, 
and ordinary expectations, but has to be fashioned into a tool which 
empowered the prince or the Sovereign. Perhaps the only alternative to 
this state of affairs is to put more trust into language as it is 
spoken. 
This does not mean that ordinary language is perfectly suited to 
all our needs. It is inevitably ambiguous, and often poorly used. In 
some situations, speech is simply inadequate. What good is language to 
a slave? In The Tempest, Miranda reproaches Caliban, a slave, for his 
revolt: 
I pitied thee, 
Took pains to make thee speak, taught thee each hour 
One thing or another : when thou didst not , savage 
Know thy own meaning, I endowed thy purposes 
With words that made them known. 
He responds: 
You taught me language; and my profit on't 
Is, I know how to curse. 5 
When the attainment of one's purpose is hopeless, Caliban's bitter 
reply is apt. But though language cannot solve all our problems, our 
6 7  
response should not be despair or contempt for what language £fill do. 
The solution is not to take language out of people's hands (or mouths) 
by preventing them from understanding what they hear, for if people 
cannot speak and understand language, using it to fully communicate 
their thoughts, then it is not fulfilling its most basic function. 
Language cannot provide absolute certainty because it is a human 
quality, and absolute certainty cannot be created where none exists. 
But neither is language pure chaos. It can be discussed and better 
understood. This, however, requires a consciousness of how we use 
words, and a basic agreement about the ways in which language may be 
used in the political realm. We see in the writings of Machiavelli and 
Hobbes the creativity language is capable of, and the lucidity with 
which it may present ideas to us, but the ways in which their theories 
put language to use is ultimately dehumanizing because they view 
language as a way of subduing people, rather than an essential, and 
potentially positive aspect of human nature and relationships. 
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